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INTERPRETATION RULES AND GOOD 
FAITH AS OBSTACLES TO THE UK’S 
RATIFICATION OF THE CISG AND  
TO THE HARMONIZATION OF  
CONTRACT LAW IN EUROPE 
Nathalie Hofmann 
 
 
ABSTRACT: 
This essay examines Article 7 of the CISG, the provision on the 
Convention‟s interpretation, through the lenses of both German and 
English law in order to shed light on interpretative issues in which 
there are divergent views in common law and civil law systems. The 
essay further provides possible reasons for the non-ratification of 
the CISG by the UK in contrast to its broad acceptance in Germany.  
The author more closely examines the issue of good faith as a prin-
ciple of contract law, its vagueness being one of the possible reasons 
for the reluctance to ratify the CISG in England.  The essay will 
conclude with an outlook on current and future efforts to harmonize 
contract law in Europe, notably with regards to the new (Draft) 
Common Frame of Reference. The question raised is whether the 
Common Frame of Reference has a chance of being accepted by the 
European civil law countries as well as by England and Wales as 
common law jurisdictions. 
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Professor Albert Kritzer for his very valuable comments and advice and the Cen-
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the University of Geneva, specializing in comparative and international com-
mercial law.  All translations from German texts, unless otherwise indicated, are 
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INTRODUCTION 
“Companies doing business in Europe presently have to deal 
with 25 different jurisdictions.”1  In the German newspaper Han-
delsblatt, Germany‟s former chancellor Gerhard Schröder ex-
plained in an article that legal diversity in Europe is one of the 
obstacles to the efficient functioning of the European Union‟s sin-
gle market in particular and to economic growth generally in Eu-
rope.  While this observation is fairly accurate, it should be kept 
in mind that a small part of contract law: the law of sales, is close 
to being harmonized not only in Europe, but also worldwide. 
The harmonization of international sales law is largely due to 
the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International 
Sale of Goods (“CISG”),2 which today is the most successful and 
noteworthy result of the process of unification of international 
contract law.3  It has gained worldwide acceptance4 and has been 
adopted by seventy-two states,5 including most major trading na-
tions.  However, in Europe there is still a flaw in the idea of a uni-
form sales law; not all European Union (“EU”) states have ratified 
the CISG.  The most important European non-member is the 
United Kingdom (“UK”).6  Other EU states that have not yet rati-
fied the CISG are Ireland, Portugal, and Malta.  The non-
 
 1 Gerhard Schröder, Sieben Chancen für mehr Wachstum in Europa [Seven 
Chances for More Growth in Europe], HANDELSBLATT (F.R.G), Oct. 26, 2005, at 5 
(emphasis added), official text available at http://www.handelsblatt. 
com/politik/deutschland/sieben-chancen-fuer-mehr-wachstum-in-europa;8093 71.  
 2 United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of 
Goods, Apr. 11, 1980, 1489 U.N.T.S. 3, 19 I.L.M. 671, available at 
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu [hereinafter “CISG” or “the Convention”]. 
 3 See Peter Huber, Comparative Sales Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
COMPARATIVE LAW 937, 939 (Reinhard Zimmermann & Mathias Reimann eds., 
2006). 
 4 See Peter Schlechtriem, Introduction to COMMENTARY ON THE UN 
CONVENTION ON THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS (CISG) 1 (Peter Schlechtriem 
& Ingeborg Schwenzer eds., 2006). 
 5 See Status 1980: United Nations Convention on Contracts for the Inter-
national Sale of Goods, Apr. 11, 1980, 1489 U.N.T.S. 3, available at 
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/sale_goods/1980CISG_status.h
tml (the most recent accessions are of Japan, July 1, 2008, and Lebanon, Nov. 
21, 2008). 
 6 See Ulrich Magnus, Action Plan for a European Contract Law-European 
Contract Law and CISG, pt. I, § 2, at 1 n.8, available at http://ec.  euro-
pa.eu/consumers/cons_int/safe_shop/fair_bus_pract/cont_law/stakehold-ers/5-
35.pdf. 
2https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol22/iss1/4
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ratification of the CISG by the UK is of great significance to the 
EU because the contracting states of the CISG within the EU in-
clude some of the UK‟s major trading partners7 such as Germany, 
France, the Netherlands, Belgium, Spain, and Italy. 
Part I of this essay focuses on the UK‟s non-ratification of the 
CISG and tries to identify and analyze some general differences 
between the common law system of England and Wales and civil 
law, the latter of which8 reigns in most other EU countries.  The 
German civil law is used as a convenient point of comparison to 
the common law system of the UK.  The comparative approach of 
this essay concentrates on issues of interpretation.  Part II ad-
dresses whether these issues of interpretation are obstacles to the 
Common Frame of Reference which is a current project of contract 
law harmonization in Europe. 
I. WHAT, IF ANYTHING, HINDERS THE UK FROM ADOPTING THE 
CISG? 
Although the UK played a very active part in the drafting 
and negotiating of the CISG,9 the country has not ratified the 
CISG and, to date, no serious legislative steps have been taken 
towards its ratification.10  After the Convention was promulgated, 
the UK awaited the reaction of its trading partners.  In a lecture 
in Rome, Oxford Professor Barry Nicholas described this as a “pol-
icy of wait and see.”11  After some of the UK‟s major trading part-
ners, notably the United States and Australia, and most EU 
states adopted the Convention, the UK should have been more in-
clined to ratify as well. 
 
 7 A.G. GUEST ET AL., BENJAMIN‟S SALE OF GOODS 24-26 (7th ed. 2006). 
 8 It is common, and to some extent justified, to further differentiate be-
tween Roman legal systems and Germanic legal systems.  See, e.g., Thomas 
Kadner Graziano, La methode comparative internationale, in LE CONTRAT EN 
DROIT PRIVÉ EUROPÉEN - EXERCISES DE COMPARAISON ET D‟HARMONISATION 317, 332 
(2006). 
 9 Bruno Zeller, The Development of Uniform Laws – A Historical Perspec-
tive, 14 PACE INT‟L L. REV. 163, 168 (2002). 
 10 Sally Moss, Why the UK has not yet Ratified the CISG, 25 J.L. & COM. 
483, 483 (2005). 
 11 Barry Nicholas, The United Kingdom and the Vienna Sales Convention: 
Another Case of Splendid Isolation?, Lecture at  Saggi, Conferenze e Seminari, 
Centro di Studi e Ricerche di Diritto Comparato e Straniero [Centre for Compar-
ative and Foreign Law Studies] (Mar. 1993) (Austria), available at 
http://servizi.iit.cnr.it/~crdcs/crdcs/frames9.htm. 
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The first steps were taken in 1989 and in 199712 when the 
Department of Trade and Industry issued consultation documents 
asking the business community for opinions on an eventual ratifi-
cation of the CISG.  While there was a majority in favor of ratifi-
cation, the number of responses received were disappointing and 
not representative, both in 1989 (55 responses, 28 in favor, 17 
against, 10 neutral)13 and in 1997 (36 responses, 26 in favor, 7 
against, 3 neutral).14  Nevertheless, one must dispense with the 
idea that the UK will eventually adopt the Convention as soon as 
there is time available in the legislative program.15  Apparently, it 
is mainly the delay of the legislative process that prevents the UK 
from becoming a contracting state of the CISG.16  In fact, most 
English books on the sale of goods seem to take an eventual ratifi-
cation for granted. There appears to be consent in the English 
doctrine that the predecessors of the CISG, the Uniform Laws on 
International Sales, which the UK has adopted, have been super-
seded by the Convention.17  Moreover, the growing importance of 
trading partners in Asia is likely to be another factor for the UK 
to take into account when it reconsiders its position regarding the 
adoption of the CISG.  In 1988, China ratified the CISG,18 and re-
cently in 2008, Japan, another top five exporter and importer,19 
 
 12 DEPARTMENT OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY, UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON 
CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS (VIENNA SALES CONVENTION): 
A CONSULTATION DOCUMENT (1997) [hereinafter DTI CONSULTATION DOCUMENT], 
available at http://bis.ecgroup.net/Search.aspx. 
 13 Id. ¶ 21. 
 14 Moss, supra note 10, at 483. 
 15 669 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) (2005) WA86; Alison E. Williams, Forecast-
ing the Potential Impact of the Vienna Sales Convention on International Sales 
Law in the UK, in 12 REVIEW OF THE CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE 
INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS (CISG) 9-57 (2000-01), available at 
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/williams.html#3. 
 16 Moss, supra note 10, at 483. 
 17 See CAROLE MURRAY, SCHMITTHOFF „S EXPORT TRADE: THE LAW AND 
PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 853 (Leo D'Arcy & Barbara Cleave eds., 11th 
ed. 2007); A. G. GUEST ET AL., supra note 7, at 24-26; but see JOSEPH CHITTY, 2 
CHITTY ON CONTRACTS 1291 (Hugh Beale et al. eds., 29th ed. 2004) [hereinafter 
CHITTY] (stating a little more reluctantly whether “the UK [should] adopt the 
Convention”). 
 18 See Status 1980 - United Nations Convention on Contracts for the Inter-
national Sale of Goods, Apr. 11, 1980, 1489 U.N.T.S. 3, available at 
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/sale_goods/1980CISG_status.h
tml. 
 19 In 2007, Japan was the world‟s fourth biggest exporter and importer. 
4https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol22/iss1/4
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ratified the Convention. 
Section A will explain why and how the UK initially ratified 
the Uniform Laws on International Sales, but not the CISG.  The 
following section will consider some of the possible reasons for the 
UK‟s long-time reluctance to adopt the CISG by analyzing Article 
7 of the CISG, which is the Convention‟s provision on statutory 
interpretation. 
A. The Uniform Laws - Why the UK Adopted the “Wrong” 
International Sales Law 
The history of the unification of international sales law dates 
back to the 1920s, when scholars of Western European countries, 
first and foremost Ernst Rabel in his “Blue Report,”20  began for-
mulating ideas about a uniform law of international sales and, in 
1926, founded the International Institute for the Unification of 
International Private Law (“UNIDROIT”).21  The CISG was there-
fore not the first attempt to unify international sales law.  After 
World War II interrupted the work of UNIDROIT, two conven-
tions were adopted at a UNIDROIT conference in The Hague in 
1964.  These conventions were the Uniform Law on the Interna-
tional Sale of Goods (“ULIS”) and the Convention relating to a 
Uniform Law on the Formation of Contracts for the International 
Sale of Goods (“ULFIS”). 
However, these conventions were not very successful.22 They 
were only implemented by nine states: Belgium, the Gambia, 
Germany, Israel, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, San Mari-
no, and the UK.  Gambia and the UK are the only surviving con-
tracting states.23  While the Uniform Laws have achieved consi-
 
WTO Report, International Trade Statistics 2008, 12, tbl. 1.8 (2008), available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/statis_e/its2008_e/its2008_e.pdf. 
 20 ERNST RABEL, RAPPORT SUR LE DROIT COMPARÉ DE VENTE PAR LE “INSTITUT 
FÜR AUSLÄNDISCHES UND INTERNATIONALS PRIVATRECHT” DE BERLIN (1938), re-
printed in 3 ERNST RABEL, GESAMMELTE AUFSÄTZE (Hans G. Leser ed., 1967) 
(F.R.G.). 
 21 See Schlechtriem, supra note 4, at 1; Henning Lutz, The CISG and Com-
mon Law Courts: Is There Really a Problem?, 35 VICT. U. WELLINGTON L. REV. 
711, 713 (2004). 
 22 See Ole Lando, CISG and Its Followers: A Proposal to Adopt Some Inter-
national Principles of Contract Law, 53 AM. J. COMP. L. 379, 379 (2005). 
 23 See Status of the UNIDROIT conventions, http://www.unidroit.org/ eng-
lish/implement/i-64ulis.pdf, for the status of ULIS. 
5
  
150 PACE INT’L L. REV. [Vol.  22:1 
derable importance in the practice of German, Benelux and Ital-
ian courts,24 they practically remained as a dead letter in the 
UK.25  The reason for this lies in the reservation under which the 
UK adopted the Uniform Laws26 as permitted by Article V of 
ULIS stating that the UK “will apply the Uniform Law only to 
contracts in which the parties thereto have . . . chosen that Law 
as the law of the contract.” 
The courts in the UK would therefore only apply ULIS as 
well as ULFIS27 if the parties have chosen these laws to apply 
and when the parties to the contract have their places of business 
in different contracting states.28  To date, there are no reports of a 
single case in the UK where the parties have chosen the Uniform 
Laws to apply.29  In fact, it can hardly be concealed that the UK 
could not decide whether to implement the Uniform Laws,30 
which probably reflects its later reluctance to implement the 
CISG.  It is doubtful whether ratification under the reservation of 
Article V of ULIS has any purpose whatsoever.  Even without the 
ratification, party autonomy would probably allow the choice of 
the Uniform Laws anywhere in the world as long as mandatory 
provisions remain unaffected.31 
 
 24 See Schlechtriem, supra note 4, at 1; see also INTERNATIONALE 
RECHTSPRECHUNG ZU EKG UND EAG - EINE SAMMLUNG BELGISCHER, DEUTSCHER, 
ITALIENISCHER, ISRAELISCHER UND NIEDERLÄNDISCHER ENTSCHEIDUNGEN ZU DEN 
HAAGER EINHEITLICHEN KAUFGESETZEN (Peter Schlechtriem & Ulrich Magnus 
eds., 1987) (F.R.G.) (provides collection of case law from Belgium, Germany, Ita-
ly, Israel and the Netherlands on ULIS and ULFIS in German). 
 25 Magnus, supra note 6, at 2. 
 26 See Uniform Laws on International Sales Act 1967 § 1(iii).  The Uniform 
Laws on International Sales Act of 1967 incorporates ULIS and ULFIS into Eng-
lish law.  Id. 
 27 ULFIS has only ancillary character and applies only to contracts to which 
ULIS is applied.  Id. 
 28 Unlike the CISG, ULIS and ULFIS do not restrict their application to 
contracts between parties of contracting states. Cf. Art. 1(1)(a).  However, the 
UK made another reservation to that effect as permitted by Art. III ULIS and 
ULFIS.  See Uniform Laws on International Sales Act 1967 § 1(i). 
 29 Magnus, supra note 6, at 2. 
 30 HANS-JOACHIM MERTENS & ECKARD REHBINDER, INTERNATIONALES 
KAUFRECHT - KOMMENTAR ZU DEN EINHEITLICHEN KAUFGESETZEN [INTERNATIONAL 
SALES LAW - COMMENTARY ON THE UNIFORM SALES LAWS], arts. 1-2 EKG [ULIS] ¶ 
16 (1995) (F.R.G.). 
 31 Hans-Georg Landfermann, Neues Recht für den Internationalen Kauf 
[New Law for International Sales], in 
NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENZEITSCHRIFT [NJW] 385, 387 (1974) (F.R.G.). 
6https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol22/iss1/4
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The implementation of the Uniform Laws in the UK cannot 
be seen as a sign of the UK‟s general willingness to move towards 
a unification of sales law, 32 since it was implemented in a very re-
strictive way.  Unlike the Uniform Laws, the CISG cannot be 
adopted with a reservation limiting its application to cases of par-
ties‟ choice,33 and its adoption would therefore have a much great-
er influence on UK law than the reserved adoption of the Uniform 
Laws.  If the parties did not want the UK courts to apply the 
CISG they would have to opt out of it.34   In fact, the ULIS and 
ULFIS could safely be implemented without making a significant 
difference, while the adoption of the CISG on the other hand 
would bring a real change in the law applicable to international 
contracts.  As a result, the UK was less reluctant to adopt the 
Uniform Laws than it is to adopt the CISG.  This was probably 
the wrong decision since international support for the Uniform 
Laws, which were perceived as Western European creations that 
were not adapted to the needs of modern trade,35 was disappoint-
ing, especially because the CISG has clearly superseded the Uni-
form Laws. 
B. Why Not Adopt the CISG? - A Comparison of English and 
German Laws 
As stated, the resistance against adopting the CISG in the 
UK appears to have decreased.  Upon a question by Lord Lester of 
Herne Hill in the House of Lords on February 7, 2005 regarding 
why the CISG has not yet been ratified, Lord Sainsbury of Tur-
ville from the Department of Trade and Industry36 answered that, 
“[t]he UK intends to ratify the convention, subject to the availa-
bility of parliamentary time.  There have been delays in the past 
for a number of reasons, but we propose to issue a consultation 
 
 32 See Ahmad Azzouni, The Adoption of the 1980 Convention on the Interna-
tional Sale of Goods by the UK (2002), http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu 
/cisg/biblio/azzouni.html (last visited Nov. 5, 2009).  In his introduction, Azzouni 
calls the UK‟s ratification “more a form of gesture than a real commitment.” Id. 
 33 A.G. GUEST ET AL., supra note 7, at 24; CHITTY, supra note 17, at 1291. 
 34 CHITTY, supra note 17, at 1291. 
 35 Lando, supra note 22, at 379. 
 36 Now called the United Kingdom Department for Business, Innovation and 
Skills (BIS), previously referred to as Department for Business, Enterprise and 
Regulatory Reform (BERR). 
7
  
152 PACE INT’L L. REV. [Vol.  22:1 
document in the course of the next few months to examine the 
available options.”37 
However, more than three years later, in fall of 2008, no con-
sultation document had yet been issued and the statement that 
there have been “delays” in the adoption of the Convention may 
be slightly understated.  In fact, there has been considerable op-
position to the ratification of the Convention in the UK,38 and the 
supporters of the CISG are still awaiting the examination of the 
“available options” formulated by Lord Sainsbury of Turville,39 
and eventually any governmental and parliamentary steps to-
wards ratification. 40 
There are several reasons why the UK is so reluctant to adopt 
the Convention.  A commonly raised concern41 is that the CISG is 
less suitable to commodity sales42 than the English Sale of Goods 
Act due, in part, to the CISG‟s stricter provisions on contract 
avoidance in case of non-conforming goods and documents.43  For 
example, Articles 25 and 49 of the CISG indicate that a funda-
mental breach is a precondition for avoidance of contract, whereas 
according to the English Sale of Goods Act, any non-conformity 
would be considered as a breach of condition (the so-called perfect 
tender rule) and thus a ground for termination of the contract. 
Furthermore, critics allege an incompatibility of the CISG‟s provi-
 
 37 669 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) (2005) WA86. 
 38 See The Hon. Justice James Douglas, Arbitration of the International Sale 
of Goods Disputes Under the Vienna Convention, Paper delivered at the Institute 
of Arbitrators and Mediators Australia National Conference 2006, available at 
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/douglas.html. 
 39 669 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) (2005) WA86. 
 40 The CISG can only be implemented through primary legislation in the 
UK. This basically means that a member of parliament (Private Member‟s bill) 
or the Government department concerned would have to make a proposal upon 
which a bill would have to be drafted which would then have to pass several 
stages (readings, amendments, votes) in both the House of Commons and House 
of Lords. For details, see House of Commons Information Office, Parliamentary 
Stages of a Government Bill, Factsheet L1 (2007), 
http://www.parliament.uk/documents/upload/l01.pdf. 
 41 Michael Bridge, A Law for International Sales, 37 H.K. L.J. 17, 40 (2007). 
 42 A commodity sale is a sale of basic resources or agricultural products (e.g., 
crude oil, salt, rice, aluminum etc.), often traded while in transit.  See also Bruno 
Zeller, Commodity Sales and the CISG, in SHARING INTERNATIONAL LAW ACROSS 
NATIONAL BOUNDARIES: FESTSCHRIFT FOR ALBERT H. KRITZER ON THE OCCASION OF 
HIS EIGHTIETH BIRTHDAY 627, 628 (Camilla B. Andersen & Ulrich G. Schroeder 
eds., 2008). 
 43 Bridge, supra note 41, at 22-23. 
8https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol22/iss1/4
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sions on passing of risk (CISG Articles 66-70) with the Interna-
tional Commercial Terms (“INCOTERMS”) FOB (Free on Board) 
and CIF (Coast, Insurance and Freight).44  However, under CISG 
Article 6, party autonomy is an underlying principle of the CISG.  
If the contract stipulates that non-conforming goods or documents 
shall be a ground for avoidance or if it contains an INCOTERM 
such as FOB or CIF, like most commodity sales contracts,45 courts 
give effect to such terms.46  The CISG, if used in conjunction with 
INCOTERMS and the stipulations of the parties, only plays a 
supplementary role, “which may even prove palatable to the 
United Kingdom – one day!”47 
Another possible criticism is the vagueness of some of the 
Convention‟s provisions, such as Article 7 on statutory interpreta-
tion and good faith.  Given the initial lack of English case law re-
garding these provisions in contrast to the large number of cases 
decided under the Sale of Goods Act, English lawyers are cautious 
about favoring the Convention without knowing how English 
courts would apply and interpret it.48 
In the following analysis, the focus will lie on the reconcilabil-
ity of English views on (a) statutory interpretation and (b) on the 
principle of good faith with respect to Article 7 of the CISG.  Simi-
larly, it is instructive to examine a civil law perspective as a point 
of comparison when determining UK‟s apprehension in ratifying 
the CISG.  More specifically, the German perspective with regard 
to statutory interpretation and good faith is dispositive since con-
trary to the UK, Germany more readily welcomed the ratification 
of the CISG.49  This analysis may be useful to give an outlook on 
 
 44 Id. at 37-38. 
 45 See Guide to CISG Article 67, Text of Secretariat Commentary on Article 
79 of the 1978 Draft [draft counterpart of CISG art. 67], http://www. 
cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/text/secomm/secomm-67.html (last visited Oct. 29, 2009). 
 46 Lachmi Singh & Benjamin Leisinger, A Law for International Sale of 
Goods: A Reply to Michael Bridge, 20 PACE INT‟L L. REV. 161, 188 (2008). 
 47 Ingeborg Schwenzer, The Danger of Domestic Pre-Conceived Views with 
Respect to the Uniform Interpretation of the CISG: The Question of Avoidance in 
the Case of Non-Conforming Goods and Document, 36 VICT. U. WELLINGTON L. 
REV. 795, 807 (2005). 
 48 However, there is a growing caseload on the CISG by courts of other coun-
tries, including common law countries such as Australia, New Zealand or the 
United States, to refer to. Cf. Pace CISG Database, 
Country Case Schedule, http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cisg/text/casecit.html. 
 49 As shown by the relatively early entry into force (Jan. 1, 1991), the large 
9
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possible consequences for both English law and jurisprudence and 
for the interpretation of the CISG, should the UK eventually rati-
fy the CISG.  At the very least, examining the German approach 
as a point of reference might shed light on some obstacles that 
other projects directed at the harmonization of European contract 
law currently face.50 
1. Article 7 and Statutory Interpretation: Literal vs. Purposive 
Approach 
Article 7(1) of the CISG states that “[in] the interpretation of 
this Convention, regard is to be had to its international character 
and to the need to promote uniformity in its application and the 
observance of good faith in international trade.”  In order to pro-
mote uniformity in the CISG‟s application, it is necessary that 
courts in different legal systems apply similar rules when inter-
preting the Convention‟s provisions in order to avoid divergent re-
sults.  However, the traditional approach of statutory interpreta-
tion applied by English courts is different from the approach used 
in civil law jurisdictions.  In fact, to a German lawyer, the English 
rules of interpretation might even appear strange and irritating.51 
a. Traditional English Approach to Statutory Interpretation 
Originating at different stages in legal history, three rules of 
statutory interpretation have been identified in the UK, namely 
the literal, golden and mischief rules.  According to the literal 
rule, words must be given their ordinary and natural meaning.  
The golden rule allows a departure from the ordinary meaning on-
ly if there is ambiguity or an absurd result, while the mischief 
rule looks at the mischief the statute was supposed to cure in or-
 
amount of scholarly writing on the CISG in German and the large number of re-
ported cases from Germany. See Pace CISG Database, Bibliography of CISG Ma-
terials in German, http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/biblio-ger.html (last vi-
sited Dec. 27, 2009); Pace CISG Database, Country Case Schedule, Germany, 
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cisg/text/casecit.html#germany (last visited Dec. 27, 
2009). 
 50 See infra Part II. 
 51 Kurt Haertel & Dieter Stauder, Zur Auslegung Von Internationalem Ein-
heitsrecht [On the Interpretation of International Uniform Law], 2 GRUR INT‟L 
85, 86 (1982) (F.R.G.). 
10https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol22/iss1/4
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der to interpret the statute. 52 
While those rules seem to allow for some flexibility, especially 
since in practice judges may choose their preferred rule or apply 
all three,53 the rules were often applied in a rather restrictive 
manner.  As matter of principle, Parliament‟s intention had to 
appear directly from the text of the statute and neither the legis-
lative history (travaux préparatoires)54 nor a doctrine55 was regu-
larly considered as an appropriate aid for statutory interpreta-
tion.56 
b. German Approach to Statutory Interpretation 
Under German law it is generally accepted that the court, 
when interpreting statutes, takes into account the literal meaning 
of the words, the grammatical structure of the sentence, the legis-
lative history, and the systematic context of a legal rule.57  Ger-
man courts regularly cite parliamentary materials58 as well as 
different opinions in legal textbooks.  When it comes to interpret-
ing provisions of the CISG, German courts also look at the legisla-
tive history of provisions59 as well as at international scholarly 
writing.60 
The most flexible approach to interpret statutes accepted un-
der German law is the so-called teleological approach (teleolo-
gische Auslegung), which allows the judge to look for what he con-
siders to be the purpose (telos) of a statute in order to reduce or 
 
 52 S.H. BAILEY ET AL., THE MODERN ENGLISH LEGAL SYSTEM (5th ed. 2007). 
 53 Id. 
 54 Cf., e.g., Davis v. Johnson, [1978] 1 All E.R. 1132 (Eng.) (where the use of 
parliamentary minutes was not permitted by the House of Lords). 
 55 It used to be convention that works of living authors could not be cited in 
court, since they might change their minds. However, this convention is no long-
er observed (see SMITH, BAILEY & GUNN, supra note 52, ¶ 7-033). 
 56 Haertel & Stauder, supra note 51, at 86-87. 
 57 Reinhard Zimmermann, Characteristic Aspects of German Legal Culture, 
in INTRODUCTION TO GERMAN LAW 1, 24 (Mathias Reimann & Joachim Zekoll eds., 
2005). 
 58 In Germany parliamentary materials are published as “Bundestag-
sdrucksachen” (BT-Drs.). 
 59 E.g., Oberlandesgericht Frankfurt am Main [OLG] [Provincial Court of 
Appeal], Apr. 20, 1994, 13 U 51/93, http://www.unilex.info/case.cfm?pid=1&do 
=case&id=47&step=FullText (making reference to a rejected Canadian proposal 
to include a criterion of “satisfactory quality” into Article 35 of CISG). 
 60 Close to all German decisions refer to legal doctrine. 
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extend its application, departing thereby from its wording.  This 
is a rather wide approach and might even be criticized for going 
far beyond what can be called interpretation, constituting in fact 
a form of judicial law making.61 
c. Modern English Approach to Interpreting International 
Conventions 
If the UK were to ratify the CISG, there is danger that Eng-
lish judges will interpret its provisions too literally without taking 
into account the history of the Convention at the Vienna Confe-
rence and the aim to achieve uniformity.  There is a concern that 
English courts tend to regard legislation adopting international 
conventions “as a step in the development of English law, . . . in-
clined to apply to such legislation canons of construction devel-
oped by English municipal law [and] to construe such legislation 
in the light of previous English authorities.”62 
However, given the recent developments in English jurispru-
dence, this concern must be considered minimal.  Today, even 
with regard to the interpretation of English statutes, the attitude 
of English courts is considerably more relaxed.  External aids of 
interpretation such as modern textbooks,63 and since the House of 
Lords decision Pepper v. Hart,64 parliamentary materials are ad-
mitted.  In fact, English courts now seem to prefer the so-called 
purposive approach to statutory construction.  This approach calls 
for the statute to be interpreted in light of its purpose, which, of 
course, needs to first be discovered with the help of interpretative 
aids.  Lord Scarman, in a lecture held in Australia, described this 
evolution rather ironically.  He emphasized that “[i]n London no-
one would now dare to choose the literal rather than a purposive 
construction.”65 
 
 61 CLAUS-WILHELM CANARIS & KARL LARENZ, METHODENLEHRE DER 
RECHTSWISSENSCHAFT 187 (3d ed. 1995) (F.R.G.). 
 62 Francis A. Mann, The Interpretation of Uniform Statute, 62 L.Q. REV. 278, 
284 (1946). 
 63 RICHARD WARD ET. AL., WALKER & WALKER‟S ENGLISH LEGAL SYSTEM 11 
(9th ed. 2005); see also Bettinson v. Langton, [1999] 2 All E.R. 367, 375 (Eng.) 
(Robert Walker LJ referring to various textbooks as “valuable assistance”). 
 64 Pepper (Inspector of Taxes) v. Hart, [1992] 3 W.L.R 1032 (Eng.) (setting 
several conditions in which parliamentary materials may be referred to). 
 65 Lord Scarman, The Common Law Judge and the Twentieth Century - 
Happy Marriage or Irretrievable Breakdown?, 7 MONASH U. L. REV. 1, 6 (1980). 
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When it comes to the interpretation of international conven-
tions, two English House of Lords decisions, James Buchanan & 
Co. v. Babco Forwarding & Shipping66 and Fothergill v. Monarch 
Airlines,67 show that English courts thoughtfully chose their in-
terpretation methods and interpret provisions in light of the aim 
of the Convention.  In James Buchanan, Lord Wilberforce clari-
fied that interpreting statutes is different from interpreting in-
ternational conventions when stating that, “[t]he assumed and of-
ten repeated generalization that English methods are narrow, 
technical and literal, whereas continental methods are broad, ge-
nerous and sensible, seems to me insecure at least as regards in-
terpretation of international conventions.”68 
After considering both the English and the French texts69 of 
the Convention on the Contract for the International Carriage of 
Goods by Road as well as interpretative decisions from different 
jurisdictions, the Lords found the French text no more precise 
than the English text, and the foreign court decisions too diverg-
ing to be of much help.70  Nevertheless, it was held by the majori-
ty71 that any interpretation should be “unconstrained by technical 
rules of English law, or by English legal precedent, but on broad 
principles of general acceptation.”72  This demonstrates that Eng-
lish courts are able to interpret a convention‟s provision with re-
gards to its international character.  This notion is in accord with 
Article7 of the CISG and would be instructive if the CISG were 
ever adopted in the UK. 
 
 66 James Buchanan & Co. v. Babco Forwarding & Shipping, Ltd., [1978] 1 
Lloyd‟s Rep. 119 (Eng.). 
 67 Fothergill v. Monarch Airlines, Ltd., [1980] 2 Lloyd‟s Rep. 295, [1980] All 
E.R. 696 (Eng.), available at http://www.jus.uio.no/lm/england.fothergill.v. mo-
narch.airlines.hl.1980. 
 68 James Buchanan & Co., 1 Lloyd‟s Rep. at 123. 
 69 Although, Viscount Dilhorne expressed some doubts about this approach.  
See id. at 126. 
 70 Id. at 123, 128 for Lord Wilberforce‟s and Lord Salmon‟s opinions. 
 71 The two dissenting members of the Court, Lord Edmund-Davies and Lord 
Fraser of Tullybelton, did not agree with this approach and applied the English 
rule “ejusdem generis.” Ejusdem generis means that general words which follow 
specific ones are taken to include only things of the same kind.  See CATHERINE 
ELLIOTT & FRANCES QUINN, ENGLISH LEGAL SYSTEM 50 (8th ed. 2007). 
 72 James Buchanan & Co., 1 Lloyd‟s Rep. at 122 (discussing Lord Wilber-
force‟s opinion). 
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In Fothergill v. Monarch Airlines,73 the House of Lords not 
only applied a purposive approach to construction but even went 
so far as to reference the legislative history of an international 
convention, the Warsaw Convention on International Carriage by 
Air.  As Lord Wilberforce opined: 
“[I]n the Federal Republics of Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg, 
The Netherlands and Belgium both “administrative “ and other 
courts have recourse in varying degrees, but generally with pru-
dence and caution, to preparatory work of the laws of the legislature 
[and] there may be cases where such travaux préparatoires can 
profitably be used.”74 
Furthermore, the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties75 (“VC”), which entered into force in the UK in 1980, pro-
vides for methods concerning the interpretation of international 
conventions in Articles 31.  Similar to Article 7 of the CISG, the 
relevant provisions of the VC stipulate as follows: 
 
VC Article 31(1): “A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith 
in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the 
terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its ob-
ject and purpose.”  
 
VC Article 32(2): “Recourse may be had to supplementary 
means of interpretation, including the preparatory work of 
the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion . . . .” 
Lord Diplock, another judge in the case of Fothergill v. Mo-
narch Airlines, acknowledged that these rules of the VC “codify 
already existing public international law.”76  Since English courts 
are prepared to follow the rules of the VC, there seems to be no 
reason to assume that they would not be willing to interpret the 
CISG in light of its international character and with the aim to 
achieve uniformity as provided by Article 7. 
Finally, it is fair to say that English courts have their own 
method of interpreting statutes - a method which has its benefits 
 
 73 Fothergill, 2 Lloyd‟s Rep. at 295. 
 74 Id. at 301-02. 
 75 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, UN Doc. 
A/Conf.39/27, available at 
http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/1_1_1969.pdf. 
 76 Fothergill, 2 Lloyd‟s Rep. at 304. 
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- but they are also prepared to look at the practice of courts in 
other jurisdictions in order to not reach a result inconsistent with 
international jurisprudence.  If the UK ratifies the CISG, juri-
sprudence by English courts might be very valuable, especially 
since other common law states such as Australia, New Zealand or 
the United States might be more willing to apply the CISG under 
emerging precedents from the UK as the “cradle of common 
law.”77 
2. Article 7 and Good Faith: A Rule of Interpretation or More? 
When the Roman philosopher, politician and lawyer Marcus 
Tullius Cicero, explained to his son Marcus that the “foundation 
of justice [was] good faith,” he referred to “truth and fidelity to 
promises and agreements.”78  Truth, fidelity, fairness, and rea-
sonableness are concepts most people would associate with good 
faith as a moral obligation.  Nevertheless, good faith is admittedly 
very vague as a legal concept.  While this essay does not attempt 
to define good faith, one has to consider that the definition of good 
faith in contract law might turn out quite differently depending 
on whether it is written from a civil or common law perspective. 
a. The Principle of Good Faith in German Law 
Section 242 of the German Civil Code79 states that: “The deb-
tor is bound to effect performance according to the requirements 
of good faith, giving consideration to common usage.”80 This gen-
eral principle originated in Roman law (bona fides) where it was 
the basis for claims based on otherwise non-defined contracts.81  
 
 77 Monica Kilian, CISG and the Problem with Common Law Jurisdictions, 
10 J. TRANSNAT‟L L. & POL‟Y 217, 233 (2001), available at 
http://www.law.fsu.edu/journals/transnational/vol102/kilian.pdf. 
 78 MARCUS TULLIUS CICERO, DE OFFICIIS 23 (Loeb Classical Library ed., Wal-
ter Miller trans., Harvard Univ. Press 1913), translation available at 
http://www.constitution.org/rom/de_officiis.htm. 
 79 Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch [BGB] [Civil Code] Aug. 18. 1896, § 242. 
 80 “Der Schuldner ist verpflichtet, die Leistung so zu bewirken, wie Treu und 
Glauben mit Rücksicht auf die Verkehrssitte es erfordern” translated in JOHN O. 
HONNOLD, UNIFORM LAW FOR INTERNATIONAL SALES UNDER THE 1980 UNITED 
NATIONS CONVENTION § 94 (3d ed. 1999). 
 81 DIETER MEDICUS, SCHULDRECHT I - ALLGEMEINER TEIL ¶ 124 (16th ed. 
2005) (F.R.G.). 
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In today‟s German law, the good faith principle is the basis, or ra-
ther the crown, of all obligations arising out of contract or tort.82  
Nowadays, the principle not only applies to contract law and tort 
law but also to the law of property, public law, and procedural 
law.83  It contains the idea that reasonable reliance84 and the in-
terests of the parties85 should be protected in every legal relation. 
German courts applied the good faith principle, inter alia, as 
a bar against claims86 or as a basis for ancillary contractual obli-
gations.87  The parties are, for example, obliged to refrain from 
every act, which could harm the purpose of the contract.88 Fur-
thermore, the concept of a pre-contractual relationship, culpa in 
contrahendo, giving rise to liability has first been developed by 
the jurisprudence based on the principle of good faith.  Now culpa 
in contrahendo has a statutory basis in section 311 II of BGB 
(German Civil Code).  Nevertheless, the principle of good faith is 
still employed to determine the obligations arising from such a 
pre-contractual relationship.89  Until the reform of the German 
Law of Obligations in 2002, section 242 of BGB was also the basis 
for the modification of contract in cases comparable to hardship or 
frustration of purpose (now BGB Section 313)90 and for the cancel-
 
 82 Id. ¶ 125. 
 83 HANS BROX & WOLF-DIETRICH WALKER, ALLGEMEINES SCHULDRECHT § 7, ¶ 
1 (32d ed. 2007) (F.R.G.). 
 84 See Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Supreme Court], May 22, 1985 (F.R.G.), 94 
Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshof in Zivilsachen [BGHZ], 344 (351) 
(F.R.G.); OTTO PALANDT ET AL., BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH (BGB), KOMMENTAR § 
242, ¶ 3 (67th ed. 2008). 
 85 PALANDT, supra note 84, § 242, ¶ 5. 
 86 So called “unzulässige Rechtsausübung” (improper exercise of a right).  
See, e.g., Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshof in Zivilsachen [BGHZ] [Su-
preme Court] 10, 75 (F.R.G.); BGHZ 79, 204; BGHZ 94, 246. This bar applies for 
example if someone claims a sum he is bound to repay shortly afterwards or in 
cases of venire contra factum proprium (contradictory behavior). 
 87 See, e.g., Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Supreme Court], Mar 10, 1983, III ZR 
169/81, published in NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENZEITSCHRIFT [NJW] 2814 (1983); 
PALANDT, supra note 84, § 242, ¶¶ 23-25. 
 88 See, e.g., Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Supreme Court], VIII ZR 99/94, Mar 
13, 1996, VIII ZR 99/94 (F.R.G.), published in Neue JURISTISCHE 
WOCHENZEITSCHRIFT-RECHTSPRECHUNGSREPORT [NJW-RR] 949 (1996); Bundes-
gerichtshof [BGH] [Supreme Court], Oct. 15, 2004, V ZR. 100/04 (F.R.G.), pub-
lished in ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT [ZIP] 2345 (2004). 
 89 BROX & WALKER, supra note 83, § 7, ¶ 12. 
 90 So called “Wegfall der Geschäftsgrundlage,” based on the Roman concept 
clausula rebus sic stantibus. 
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lation of long term contracts for just cause (now BGB Section 
314).91  In turn, the principle of good faith has to be respected in 
the interpretation of contracts.  Section 157 of BGB states this 
expressly: “Contracts shall be interpreted according to the re-
quirements of good faith, taking into account common usage.” 
In addition, section 242 of BGB is often criticized for being 
too imprecise and giving rise to judicial law making based on eq-
uity.92  The German Federal Supreme Court held in an important 
decision that the courts should not substitute the consequences 
imposed by the contract or by law with consequences which they 
consider more equitable under the circumstances.93  Section 242 
of BGB should only be applied to set groups of cases which have 
been defined by 100 years of jurisprudence.94 
As seen in Germany, the concept of good faith applies not on-
ly to the interpretation of statutory provisions, but it has further 
functions.  For example, good faith concretizes the manner in 
which obligations are to be fulfilled, supplements contracts by be-
ing a basis for ancillary obligations, serves as a bar to claims and 
may correct unjust results of the law or clauses of a contract. 95 
Although the notion has been clarified by the German juri-
sprudence, the broadness of the term “Treu und Glauben” (good 
faith) still gives rise to uncertainty.  Probably every first year law 
student in Germany is warned to apply section 242 of BGB only 
very cautiously, its unjustified application being a common mis-
take in civil law examinations.  This does not only seem to be a 
phenomenon among law students but even courts and scholars 
because they tend to abandon concrete legal provisions by apply-
ing the general section 242.  As Professor Schlechtriem remarked 
in a 1997 publication of the Centro di studi e ricerche di diritto 
comparato e straniero in Rome: “[O]ne can find a court decision or 
a scholarly theory applying the [good faith] provision to almost 
every situation governed by the Civil Code, and in addition very 
 
 91 PALANDT, supra note 84, § 242, ¶ 2. 
 92 BROX & WALKER, supra note 83, § 7, ¶¶ 2-3. 
 93 See Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Supreme Court], VIII ZR 119/84, May 06, 
1985 VIII ZR 119/84 (F.R.G.), published in NEUE JURISTISCHE 
WOCHENZEITSCHRIFT [NJW] 2579, 2580 (1985) (F.R.G.). 
 94 PALANDT, supra note 84, § 242, ¶ 3. 
 95 Cf. PALANDT, supra note 84, § 242, ¶¶ 13-14a (explaining these four func-
tions of good faith). 
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often overriding the text and the meaning of special provisions.”96 
In sum, the German good faith principle, as codified in sec-
tion 242, gives courts the flexibility that is necessary when deal-
ing with imprecise, incomplete or unjust contracts or legal provi-
sions.  However, the preference is to follow more detailed and 
precise provisions of the BGB rather than the vague concept of 
“Treu und Glauben.”  One has to admit that any excessive use of a 
general good faith principle leads to uncertainty and unpredicta-
bility of the law.  Fortunately, the risk of uncertainty is limited in 
Germany, since many valuable results of the application of the 
good faith principle have been codified. With regard to those poss-
ible applications, which lack specific statutory basis, there is 
enough case law specifying detailed criteria for the application of 
the good faith provision found in section 242 of BGB. 
b. Is There a Principle of Good Faith Under English Law? 
Some common law jurisdictions have taken up or at least 
considered the concept of good faith.97  The American Uniform 
Commercial Code (“UCC”), for example, defines good faith in Ar-
ticle 2 Section 2-103 (1)(b): “„Good faith‟ in the case of a merchant 
means honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable commer-
cial standards of fair dealing in the trade.”  However, the UCC‟s 
good faith concept does not go as far as the German good faith 
concept which also applies to pre-contractual obligations.  Good 
faith is made specifically applicable to the UCC only to the extent 
set forth in UCC Article 1 Section 1-203; namely, “[e]very contract 
or duty within this Act imposes an obligation of good faith in its 
performance or enforcement.” 
In Bobux Marketing v. Raynor Marketing, decided on October 
3, 2001, the Court of Appeal of Wellington in New Zealand ex-
amined the development of the concept of good faith in common 
law with obiter reference to the CISG and the UNIDROIT prin-
ciples.  The presiding Judge Thomas found that good faith is per-
 
 96 Peter Schlechtriem, Good Faith in German Law and in International Uni-
form Laws, Lecture at Saggi, Conferenze e Seminari, Centro di Studi e Ricerche 
di Diritto Comparato e Straniero [Centre for Comparative and Foreign Law Stu-
dies] (Mar. 3, 1997), translation available at http://servizi.iit.cnr.it/~crdcs/ 
crdcs/frames24.htm. 
 97 CHITTY, supra note 17, at 1291. 
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ceived “as loyalty to a promise”98 and that there should be an ob-
ligation to perform in good faith, at least in long-term contracts.99  
On the other hand, under English law, good faith is not a general 
requirement concerning the exercise of legal rights.100  Some scho-
lars even consider the notion of good faith as basically unknown 
to English law; a British attorney would “rarely comprehend”101 
the concept of good faith or “not know quite what it means.”102  
While this could also be said of most German lawyers, English 
courts are certainly, or perhaps justifiably, more reluctant to as-
sume duties arising out of such a broad concept. 
In the leading English House of Lord‟s case Walford v. Miles, 
a pre-contractual duty to negotiate in good faith was denied on 
the ground that this would be inconceivable with the nature of 
negotiations in which each party pursues its own interests.103  
Traditionally, an English judge is more concerned with “preserv-
ing the parties‟ freedom to contract” and ensuring that contracts 
are “performed accurately according to their precise wording” and 
less concerned “with providing means for ensuring the fairness in 
the relationship between the parties.”104 
There is no general principle of good faith established in Eng-
lish law.  However, this has not always been the case.  In 1766, 
Lord Mansfield considered good faith as the “governing principle 
[which] is applicable to all contracts and dealings.”105  Further-
 
 98 Bobux Marketing, Ltd. v. Raynor Marketing, Ltd., [2002] 1 N.Z.L.R. 506, 
2001 NZLR LEXIS 66 (H.C.), available at 
http://www.ipsofactoj.com/international/2002/Part02/int2002(2)-008.htm. 
 99 However, the other two judges did not comment on the issue of good faith 
and dismissed the appeal on different grounds. Id. ¶ 81. 
 100 Azzouni, supra note 32, pt. I, subdiv. B. 
 101 Christopher Sheaffer, The Failure of the United Nations Convention on 
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods and a Proposal for a New Uniform 
Global Code in International Sales Law, 15 CARDOZO J. INT‟L & COMP. L. 461, 465 
(2007). 
 102 Roy Goode, The Concept of “Good Faith" in English Law, Lecture at Sag-
gi, Conferenze e Seminari, Centro di Studi e Ricerche di Diritto Comparato e 
Straniero [Centre for Comparative and Foreign Law Studies] (1992), translation 
available at http://servizi.iit.cnr.it/~crdcs/crdcs/frames2.htm. 
 103 Walford v. Miles [1992] 2 A.C. 128. 
 104 Giuditta Cordero Moss, Contracts between Consumer Protection and 
Trade Usages: Some Observations on the Importance of State Contract Law, in 
COMMON FRAME OF REFERENCE AND EXISTING EC CONTRACT LAW 64, 68 (Reiner 
Schulze ed., 2008). 
 105 Carter v. Boehm, (1766) 97 Eng. Rep. 1164 (K.B.). 
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more, even though English law may not acknowledge a general 
principle of good faith, comparable considerations such as fairness 
and reasonableness are considered in various situations.106  When 
interpreting contracts, English judges seek to reach a reasonable 
result,107 since the courts sometimes include implied terms into 
contracts for reasons of fairness.108  Certain contract types, such 
as agency contracts and mortgages, impose a duty on the parties 
to act other than in their own interest.109 Finally, equitable con-
cepts, such as promissory estoppel,110 or equitable remedies,111 
which the Courts grant at their discretion, are solely based on 
fairness.112 
In fact, the civil law idea of good faith is, in its broadest 
sense, probably related to the English concept of equity.113  In 
England, equity developed around the 15th century to balance out 
the harsh rules of the common law.114  Equitable remedies are dif-
ferent from common law remedies, and equity used to be adminis-
tered by different courts.115  Since 1873, equity has been adminis-
tered by the same courts as the common law;116  where there is 
conflict between common law and equity, equity prevails.117  Of 
course, equity is entirely a system of justice while good faith finds 
its main application only in contract law.  Nevertheless, both are 
based on the idea of natural justice and fairness which cannot al-
ways be achieved by strict rules of law. 
To conclude, English law does not have a general principle of 
 
 106 CHITTY, supra note 17, at 1291. 
 107 Id. 
 108 Id.; Johan Steyn, The Role of Good Faith and Fair Dealing in Contract 
Law: A Hair-Shirt Philosophy?, DENNING L.J. 131, 133 (1991). 
 109 CHITTY, supra note 17, at 1291. 
 110 Cf. Cent. London Prop. Trust, Ltd. v. High Trees House, Ltd., [1947] K.B. 
130 (the leading case on promissory estoppel). 
 111 For example, specific performance is an equitable remedy under English 
law. 
 112 CHITTY, supra note 17, at 1291. 
 113 See generally 5 J.F. O‟CONNOR, GOOD FAITH IN ENGLISH LAW (1990). 
 114 ELLIOTT & QUINN, supra note 71, at 108-09. 
 115 First, equity was administered by the Chancellor, a member of the clergy 
and chief minister of the King. 
 116 The Judicature Acts 1873-75 established the English court structure of 
today. 
 117 This was first held in the Earl of Oxford’s Case decided in 1615.  ELLIOT & 
QUINN, supra note 71, at 109. 
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good faith.  Certainly, pre-contractual duties cannot arise from 
this principle under English law.  In contrast, under German law, 
a culpa in contrahendo liability has been developed from the good 
faith concept.  However, English lawyers are familiar with con-
cepts such as fairness, reasonableness and equity.  In many cases, 
English lawyers achieve the same results by way of detailed rules 
and duties established by precedents in the same way civil law-
yers would achieve a similar result by assuming a duty of good 
faith.118 
Nevertheless, one has to admit that English lawyers will 
have a problem with accepting a duty of good faith as far reaching 
as provided by German law.  This result is predictable given the 
defensible criticism of the broadness and uncertainty of the Ger-
man notion of good faith.119 
c. Good Faith Under the CISG 
Article 7 of the CISG provides that in interpreting the Con-
vention there shall be regard for promoting “the observance of 
good faith in international trade.”  This language was adopted as 
a compromise between two divergent views.120  The first, mostly 
expressed by civil law delegates, was that there should be a gen-
eral rule that the parties must act in good faith; the other view 
was that such a rule would lead to uncertainty.  The comparison 
between German and English laws illustrates the broad sweep of 
such divergent views.  Under German law, the good faith prin-
ciple was and may still be “Mädchen für Alles,”121 meaning a solu-
tion of last resort to any legal problem. In contrast, English law 
does not acknowledge a general good faith principle, but only spe-
cific applications of it. 
Of course, during the deliberations to Article7 of the CISG at 
the Vienna Conference, the UK representative was opposed to the 
introduction of a separate provision calling for the respect of good 
 
 118 See Goode, supra note 102. 
 119 See Schlechtriem, supra note 96. 
 120 See HONNOLD, supra note 80, § 94. 
 121 “Mädchen für Alles” is a colloquial German expression meaning utility 
man / girl Friday. See Gyula Eörsi, General Provisions, in INTERNATIONAL SALES: 
THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE 
OF GOODS 2-6 (Matthew Bender ed., 1984), available at 
http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/eorsi1.html#203. 
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faith and fair dealing.122  This view was respected by the majority 
of the other delegates and an express reference to the good faith 
principle is to be found solely in Article7 relating to the Conven-
tion‟s interpretation.  However, there are numerous applications 
of the good faith principle throughout the Convention.  For exam-
ple, Article 16(2)(b) addresses the irrevocability of an offer in cas-
es where there is reasonable act of reliance on such irrevocability; 
Article 21(2) addresses the status of an acceptance which was re-
ceived late although it was dispatched timely or Article 40, which 
bars the seller from relying on a failure of timely notice of non-
conformity by the buyer if the seller knew or could not have been 
unaware of the non-conformity.123  All these articles are premised 
on the good faith principle.  Moreover, the reasonable person 
standard found in Article 8(2) of the CISG, concerning the inter-
pretation of statements and conduct of the parties, can also serve 
a similar purpose to that of an obligation of good faith and fair 
dealing. 
While the good faith principle in Article 7 of the CISG is very 
restrictive, its meaning is still unclear124 when compared to the 
German Law of Obligations‟ section 242 of BGB.125  The problem 
that arises is how to find the relevant standards of good faith, 
given that those standards differ considerably in the world and 
that the principle of autonomous interpretation does not allow for 
transfer of domestic good faith concepts into the Convention.  At 
the same time, good faith should not be used as a “super-tool” to 
override more specific rules of the CISG.126 
 
 122 Legislative History, 1980 Vienna Diplomatic Conference, Summary 
Records of Meetings of the First Committee, 5th meeting (Mar. 13, 1980), 
http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/firstcommittee/Meeting5.html. 
 123 Cf. Secretariat Commentary on Article 6 of the 1978 Draft [draft counter-
part of CISG art. 7(1)], http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/text/secomm/se comm-
7.html, for further examples. 
 124 Cf. Benedict C. Sheehy, Good Faith in the CISG: The Interpretation Prob-
lems of Article 7 (Berkeley College, Working Paper No. 339, 2004), in THE 
BERKELEY ELECTRONIC PRESS (BEPRESS) LEGAL SERIES, 
http://law.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1815&context=expresso (pro-
viding an extensive paper on the CISG‟s good faith principle). 
 125 PETER SCHLECHTRIEM, UNIFORM SALES LAW - THE UN-CONVENTION ON 
CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS 39 (1986), available at 
http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/schlechtriem.html. 
 126 Peter Huber, Some Introductory Remarks on the CISG, in 6 
INTERNATIONALES HANDELSRECHT 228, 228-29 (2006), available at http://www. 
cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/huber.html. 
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In practice, there appears to be a consensus that good faith in 
Article 7 is a principle of interpretation and not a duty.  However, 
prior case law has applied Article 7‟s principle of good faith rather 
broadly.  In the French case, BRI Production “Bonaventure” v. 
Pan African Export,127 the court referred to Article 7 of the CISG 
and awarded 10,000 francs in damages for abuse of process con-
stituting a breach of the good faith principle.  In Hungary, an ar-
bitral tribunal explicitly stated that it considered good faith not 
merely as an interpretive tool but as a standard of behavior which 
must be respected.128  Decisions like these use Article 7 to impose 
substantive obligations of good faith and fair dealing on the par-
ties, an approach highly criticized because it perverts the fact 
that Article 7 of the CISG is clearly a compromise between the far 
reaching notion of good faith in civil law and the skepticism to-
wards this notion in common law,129 as revealed by its negotiating 
history.130 
While from a civil law point of view it might be beneficial and 
desirable to introduce a duty of good faith in international 
trade,131 the legislative history of the CISG Article 7 shows that 
good faith under the CISG is not supposed to go so far as to im-
pose duties.  Still, one should not call the CISG‟s notion of good 
faith “dead” or consigned to a “ghetto.”132  The principle of good 
faith, as embodied not only in Article 7 but also in the more spe-
 
 127 Cour d‟Appel [CA][regional court of appeal] Grenoble, No. 93/3275, Feb. 
22, 1995, in JOURNAL DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL [J.D.I.] 632 (1995), translated in 
PACE REVIEW OF THE CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF 
GOODS (CISG) 379 (1998), available at http://www. 
cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/wais/db/cases2/950222f1.html. 
 128 Hungarian Chamber of Commerce and Industry Court of Arbitration, Ar-
bitral Award, No. VB/94124, Nov. 17, 1995, pt. IV, ¶ 6, available at 
http://www.unilex.info/case.cfm?pid=1&do=case&id=217&step=FullText (in 
German). 
 129 E. Allan Farnsworth, Duties of Good Faith and Fair Dealing under the 
UNIDROIT Principles, Relevant International Conventions, and National Laws, 
3 TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 47, 56 (1994); see also Disa Sim, The Scope and Appli-
cation of Good Faith in the Vienna Convention on Contracts for the International 
Sale of Goods, PACE L. SCH. INST. INT„L COM. L. (2001), 
http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/sim1.html (last updated Sept. 25, 2001). 
 130 Cf. Legislative History, supra note 122, ¶¶ 45, 54, 62 (regarding two pro-
posals of Norway and Italy to change the text of the provision which found little 
support because the text as-is already presented a “delicately-balanced compro-
mise”). 
 131 See Eörsi, supra note 121, § 2.03. 
 132 Id. 
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cific provisions such as Articles 16 (2)(b), 21(2) and 40 of the 
CISG, is acknowledged as one of the general principles on which 
the Convention is based.133  It can therefore be referred to as a 
gap-filling principle for matters governed by, but not expressly 
settled in the CISG. 
If correctly applied in line with its drafting history, the 
CISG‟s good faith principle is very restrictive.  It does not extend 
nearly as far as the German notion of good faith found in section 
242 of BGB.  If England were to adopt the CISG, good faith notion 
found in Article 7 should not materially alter or introduce major 
changes into English law.  However, given the different under-
standings of the concept drawing from the prior decided cases, 
there is some truth in the criticism often brought forward that 
good faith in Article7 of the CISG would give rise to uncertainty 
and diverging decisions.134 
C. Conclusion to Part I: Can the CISG Harmonize European 
Contract Law? 
Overall, the CISG can be considered a success because on a 
global scale the CISG has been ratified by both common law and 
civil law countries.  However, case law from common law jurisdic-
tions is still scarce.135  With the exception of Part II on the forma-
tion of contracts136 (as authorized by the Convention, compared to 
the provisions of Part IV), the reservations made by several states 
when adopting the Convention considerably limit the CISG‟s ef-
fect on the unification of Sales law.137 
 
 133 Joseph Lookofsky, The 1980 United Nations Convention on Contracts for 
the International Sale of Goods, in INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAWS - 
CONTRACTS 1, 50 (J. Herbots & R. Blanpain eds., 2000), available at 
http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/lookofsky.html. 
 134 Cf. P.J. Powers, Defining the Undefinable: Good Faith and the United Na-
tions Sale of Goods, 18 J.L. & COM. 333, 347-48 (1999), available at 
http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/powers.html (stating, “the uniformity 
sought by the CISG is definitely lacking with respect to . . . good faith”); see also 
Nicholas, supra note 11; DTI CONSULTATION DOCUMENT, supra note 12 (reflecting 
similar criticism); cf. also Derek Wheatley, Why I Oppose the Wind of Change, 
TIMES (U.K.), Mar. 27, 1990, at 31 (addressing a general concern about the dan-
ger of diverging decisions if the CISG was to be ratified in the UK). 
 135 Kilian, supra note 77, at 218. 
 136 This reservation, in accordance with Article 92 (1) of the CISG, was made 
by the Scandinavian countries Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden. 
 137 For alternative analysis, compare DTI CONSULTATION DOCUMENT , supra 
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Moreover, not only did some states limit the applicability of 
the CISG by way of reservations, many parties to contracts of sale 
also chose to explicitly exclude the application of the CISG by vir-
tue of Article 6.  True to the motto “what the peasant does not 
know, he does not eat,”138 business entities often prefer their fa-
miliar national law as opposed to the unfamiliar CISG notwith-
standing that the CISG‟s provisions might be more appropriate to 
international contracts of sale. 
Apropos of international contracts of sale, the CISG can only 
unify a small part of contract law because according to CISG Ar-
ticle 1(1), its application is restricted to contracts for the interna-
tional sale of goods.  Outside sale contracts, the CIGS does not 
cover various other areas of law including non-contract law, 
transfer of property law or unjust enrichment.  The attempt for a 
comprehensive and global unification of contract law is perhaps 
too ambitious139 but, at least within the EU, it is desirable for the 
projects of harmonization to not be limited to contracts of sale.  
Instead, these projects must aim to ensure the functioning of all 
sectors of the EU‟s single market, including the free movement of 
capital, labor, goods and services as named in Article 26 of the 
 
note 12. 
 138 Translation of the German proverb, “Was der Bauer nicht kennt, das 
frisst er nicht.” Cf. Eckart Brödermann, The Practice of Excluding the CISG: 
Time for Change?, Address at the Modern Law for Global Commerce: Congress 
to Celebrate the Fortieth Annual Season of UNCITRAL (July 9-12, 2007) (humo-
rously describing that the main reason to exclude the CISG is a lack of know-
ledge, and expressing hope that this will change soon), available at 
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/congress/Broedermann-rev.pdf.  See also 
Martin F. Koehler & Guo Yujun, The Acceptance of the Unified Sales Law 
(CISG) in Different Legal Systems: an International Comparison of Three Sur-
veys on the Exclusion of the CISG’s Application Conducted in the United States, 
Germany and China, 20 PACE INTL. L. REV. 45, 60 (2008) (reciting the analogous 
proverb "the devil you know is better than the devil you don't know"), available 
at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/koehler-yujun.html 
 139 However, with regard to commercial contracts, the UNIDROIT Principles 
are a successful step in that direction.  See Int‟l Institute for the Unification of 
Private Law, UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts 
(2004), available at 
http://www.unidroit.org/english/principles/contracts/principles2004/integralversi
onprinciples2004-e.pdf. But compared to the CISG, the UNIDROIT principles 
are not autonomous directly applicable laws. Their application depends on the 
parties‟ choice, or at least an arbitrator‟s preference. Cf. Hans Van Houtte, The 
UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts, 11 ARB. INT‟L. 
373, 378 (1995). 
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Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (“TFEU”).140 
The UK‟s ratification of the CISG, currently long overdue, 
will eventually take effect and constitute a step towards the 
process of harmonization of European contract law. The above 
analysis shows that neither the general rules on statutory inter-
pretation set out in Article 7 of the CISG, nor Article 7‟s fairly re-
strictive reference to good faith, should deter the UK from ratify-
ing the Convention.  To the contrary, once the UK ratifies the 
CISG, jurisprudence thereon by the highly regarded English 
courts might increase the CISG‟s acceptance within the interna-
tional business community.  As stated by the CISG opponent, De-
rek Whitley (Queen‟s Counsel), English judges “are so highly re-
garded that of cases heard in the Commercial Court . . . nearly 30 
per cent of all the cases had no English litigant at all.”141  Hope-
fully, once the UK adopts the CISG, the remaining non-
contracting states within the EU142 will follow. 
II. LESSONS LEARNED: HURDLES ON THE WAY TO SUCCESS FOR THE 
COMMON FRAME OF REFERENCE 
Recalling the article on legal diversity being one of the ob-
stacles to economic growth within the European Union by Ger-
many‟s former chancellor, Gerhard Schröder, cited in the intro-
duction,143 one should not forget that transnational transactions 
within the EU take place within a single market.  In fact, 
“[w]ithin the European single market, people, goods, services and 
money move around as freely as within one country . . . .  Al-
though we now take it for granted, the single market is one of the 
 
 140 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union, 2008 O.J. (C115) 47 [hereinafter TFEU]. On December 1 2009, the Treaty 
of Lisbon, 2007 O.J. (C 307) 01, entered into force, amending the Treaty estab-
lishing the European Community and the Treaty on European Union.  The 
changes are reflected in the TFEU and the Consolidated Version of the Treaty 
on European Union, 2008 O.J. (C115) 13 [hereinafter TEU]. 
 141 Wheatley, supra note 134, at 31, for whom the high number of cases with 
foreign litigants heard by the English Commercial Court proves the high reputa-
tion of English judges. Different from the author of this article, Derek Wheatley 
fears that a ratification of the CISG by the UK would imperil the “tremendous 
accolade for English law and English justice.” Id. 
 142 Ireland, Portugal and Malta. 
 143 See generally Schröder, supra note 1. 
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EU‟s greatest achievements.”144 
This single market, enabled by the Single European Act of 
1986 and launched in 1993,145 is certainly a great achievement 
because it has undoubtedly brought major benefits to businesses, 
consumers and employees alike.146  Nevertheless, the single mar-
ket cannot by itself be considered complete.  There are remaining 
obstacles that continue to prevent people, goods, services and 
money from moving around “as freely as . . . within one coun-
try”147 due to the lack of harmonized contract law in the EU.  As 
more Europeans living in different countries engage in cross-
border purchases and transactions, the legal diversity in Europe 
appears increasingly antiquated.148  This alone was enough for 
Gerhard Schröder and the former German government “to sup-
port and actively assist the Commission with its Action Plan on „A 
More Coherent European Contract Law.‟”149  By “Action Plan” 
Gerhard Schröder refers to the communication by the EU Com-
mission from 2003,150 which encourages discussion and research 
on European contract law in order to prepare a “Common Frame 
of Reference.”151  This Common Frame of Reference (“CFR”) is not 
completed yet.  Currently there is only an academic draft, re-
ferred to as the Draft Common Frame of Reference (“DCFR” or 
“the Draft”).  Following the Commission‟s Action Plan, several 
study and research groups152 have joined forces and prepared the 
 
 144 See EUROPA: Activities of the European Union: Internal Market, 
http://europa.eu/pol/singl/index_en.htm (last visited Feb. 17, 2010) [hereinafter 
EUROPA].   
 145 See EUROPA, European Commission, The EU Single Market: Historical 
Overview, http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/top_layer/index_2_en.htm (last 
visited Feb. 17, 2010). 
 146 Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS), EU Single Market 
– Introduction, http://www.berr.gov.uk/whatwedo/europeandtrade/europe/single-
market/page45642.html (last visited Feb. 17, 2010).  
 147 EUROPA, supra note 144. 
 148 See Jochen Zenthöfer, Brauchen wir ein europäisches Zivilgesetzbuch? [Do 
we need a European Civil Code?], in HUMBOLDT FORUM RECHT 40, 43 (1999), 
available at http://www.humboldt-forum-recht.de/deutsch/4-1999/ beitrag.html. 
 149 Schröder, supra note 1, at 5. 
 150 COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, A MORE COHERENT 
EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW: AN ACTION PLAN (2003), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/cons_int/safe_shop/fair_bus_pract/cont_law/com_2
003_68_en.pdf. 
 151 See id. at 16. 
 152 Participating study and research groups: Study Group on a European Civ-
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DCFR, which at this stage, contains only legal rules which are 
later to be supplemented by explanations, comparative analyses 
and examples.153  An interim edition of the DCFR, available only 
in English,154 has been communicated to the Commission and was 
published in 2008.155 
The DCFR is partly based on the Principles of European Con-
tract Law156 (“PECL”) which were prepared by the Commission on 
European Contract Law (also known as “Lando Commission,” 
named after its founder Ole Lando), whose successor is the Study 
Group.157  In contrast to PECL, the coverage of the DCFR is much 
wider.  Specifically, the PECL contains rules “on the formation, 
validity, interpretation and contents of contracts” as well as “on 
the performance of obligations.”  PECL further provides for reme-
dies for the non-performance of contractual obligations.  However, 
the DCFR also covers so-called “specific contracts,”158 as well as 
non-contractual obligations arising as the result of unjustified 
enrichment.159  The final edition of the DCFR, as opposed to the 
interim edition of 2008, will even cover some matters of movable 
 
il Code (Study Group), Research Group on the Existing EC Private Law (Acquis 
Group), Project Group on the Restatement of European Insurance Contract Law 
(Insurance Group), Association Henri Capitant, Société des Législation Com-
parée, Conseil supérieur du Notariat, Common Core Group, Research Group on 
the Economic Assessment of Contract Law Rules (Economic Impact Group), Da-
ta Base Group, Europäische Rechtsakademie (ERA). 
 153 See Stefan Leible, Europäisches Privatrecht am Scheideweg, 35 NEUE 
JURISTISCHE WOCHENZEITSCHRIFT 2558, 2560 (2008) (F.R.G.). 
 154 Although translations are desirable to encourage an early involvement of 
the public in the discussion, the Commission is apparently not willing to arrange 
for translations at this stage. This is because the academic DCFR is considerably 
longer than what the Commission intends to publish as the final CFR. See Re-
marks of Ms. Kuneva, EUR. PARL. DEB. (O-0072/2008) (Sept. 1, 2008), 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=CRE&reference= 
20080901&secondRef=ITEM-022&language=EN. 
 155 Principles, Definitions and Model Rules of European Private Law, Draft 
Common Frame of Reference (DCFR) Interim Outline Edition (Christian von 
Bar et al. eds., 2008) [hereinafter DCFR], available at http://webh01. 
ua.ac.be/storme/DCFRInterim.pdf. All references made herein to articles of the 
DCFR refer to this interim edition, being the most current available version of 
the Draft. 
 156 Id. at 24. 
 157 Study Group on a European Civil Code, SCOPE, http://www.sgecc.net/ pag-
es/en/introduction/101.scope.htm (last visited Oct. 22, 2009). 
 158 DCFR, supra note 154, at 18-19. 
 159 Id. at 19. 
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property law.160 
While intended to serve as an independent document, the 
DCFR is larger than what will be the final CFR as envisaged by 
the European Commission.161  The final CFR is supposed to have 
two main purposes.  First, it shall operate as a toolbox for Euro-
pean legislators (Commission, Council and European Parliament) 
for the revision and preparation of EU legislation (regulations, di-
rectives) in the area of contract law.162  The same holds true for 
the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and national courts faced 
with the task to interpret such legislation or national law based 
on European legislation.163  Second, the CFR might operate as an 
optional instrument - a set of legal rules which the parties may 
choose to govern their contractual relations. 
The final part of this essay concerns the CFR as a toolbox to 
help interpret European legislation in the area of contract law 
and as the basis for the so-called optional instrument.  Some as-
pects of the analysis conducted in Part I of this essay, notably 
concerning the UK‟s position on the principle of good faith, will 
help to identify possible shortcomings of the CFR in its current 
draft version.  Suffice it to note that if the CFR is intended to 
serve as an optional instrument, its content needs to be accepted 
by both civil and common law parties.  Therefore, if one of the 
parties to the CFR has an English legal background, the question 
presented is whether or not the CFR can be a viable option. 
A. Demands on Interpretation of European Uniform Law – the 
CFR as a Toolbox 
An increasing proportion of the law applicable in the EU 
member states is harmonized by European Community Private 
Law, which is based on regulations and directives.164  However, 
only some aspects of contract law are covered by European direc-
tives and regulations.  “Islands of European law within a sea of 
 
 160 Id. 
 161 Id. 
 162 See EUROPA, Consumer Affairs, European Contract Law, 
http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/cons_int/safe_shop/fair_bus_pract/cont_law/index_
en.htm (last visited Oct. 22, 2009) (summarizing the purpose of the CFR). 
 163 See Leible, supra note 153, at 2561. 
 164 5 FRANZ-JÜRGEN SÄCKER, MÜNCHENER KOMMENTAR ZUM BGB, para.196 
(Kurt Rebmann, Roland Rixecker & Franz-Jürgen Säcker eds., 2006) (F.R.G.). 
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national legal rules”165 is a popular metaphor to describe the 
fragmentary character of European Community Private Law.166  
For instance, the following European directives already harmo-
nized some areas of contract law in Europe: the Package Travel 
Directive,167 the Distance Selling Directive,168 the Unfair Con-
tracts Terms Directive,169 and the Timeshare Directive.170  As this 
enumeration shows, harmonized European Community Private 
Law mainly covers questions of consumer protection while busi-
ness to business contracts are to a great extent unaffected by 
these directives. 
Due to the fragmentary character of directives and regula-
tions in the field of European Community Private Law, there are 
numerous interactions between national laws governing the larg-
est part of contract law in Europe, and European directives and 
regulations.  These interactions pose certain difficulties to na-
tional courts and to the ECJ when ruling on the interpretation 
and application of the directives and regulations in different na-
tional contexts. 
When interpreting Article 7 of the CISG, it is required that 
regard be given to its international character along with the need 
 
 165 See Hans-Werner Eckert, Europäisierung des Privatrechts – Die Bedeu-
tung der Richtlinien der Europäischen Union für die Schaffung einer einheitli-
chen Rechtsordnung [Europeanization of Private Law – The Importance of Euro-
pean Union Directives for the Creation of a Uniform Legal System], in 
FESTSCHRIFT FÜR ALFRED SÖLLNER ZUM 70. GEBURTSTAG - EUROPAS UNIVERSALE 
RECHTSORDNUNGSPOLITISCHE AUFGABE IM RECHT DES DRITTEN JAHRTAUSENDS 240 
(Gerhard Köbler, Meinhard Heinze & Wolfgang Hromadka eds., 2000) (F.R.G.). 
 166 See Säcker, supra note 164, paras. 196, 212. 
 167 Council Directive 90/314/EEC, On Package Travel, Package Holidays and 
Package Tours, 1990 O.J. (L 158) 59, available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31990L0314:EN:NOT. 
 168 European Parliament and Council Directive 97/7/EC, On the Protection of 
Consumers in Respect of Distance Contracts, 1997 O.J. (L 144) 19, available at 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX: 
31997L0007:EN:NOT. 
 169 Council Directive 93/13/EEC, On Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts, 
1993 O.J. (L 95) 29, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/ LexUri-
Serv.do?uri=CELEX:31993L0013: EN:NOT. 
 170 Council Directive 94/47/EC, On the Protection of Purchasers in Respect of 
Certain Aspects of Contracts Relating to the Purchase of the Right to Use Im-
movable Properties on a Timeshare Basis, 1994 O.J. (L 280) 83, available at 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31994 
L0047:EN:NOT. 
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to promote uniformity in its application.171  The European Com-
munity Private Law, or national law based thereon, requires 
quite similarly that the Law is interpreted by retaining its Euro-
pean character and the need for a uniform application within the 
EU.  Therefore, any interpretation of European directives and 
regulations in the area of contract law should not be constrained 
by the national legal background in which they are applied.  In-
stead, the interpretation should be based on the acquis of contract 
law within the EU, meaning the existing EU private law in other 
directives and regulations.172  Furthermore, the interpretation 
may also be based on what can be described as the “common core” 
of the national contract laws of the member states.173 
The CFR, which is based on the academic DCFR, collects, 
consolidates, and presents the acquis (the existing EU private 
law) and the common principles of the member states‟ contract 
laws in one single publication.  It can, therefore, serve as a very 
valuable tool in assisting national and European courts to interp-
ret and apply European directives and regulations.  However, the 
academic DCFR is not restricted to issues on which there is com-
mon ground within the EU.  Many rules contained therein consti-
tute either a compromise or reflect simply what has been consi-
dered as the most appropriate or desirable rule by the scholars 
who participated in the Draft.  Judges who base an interpretation 
of EU legislation on such rules might face criticism from lawyers 
from jurisdictions that do not agree with the “compromise” or 
“most appropriate rule” of the DCFR.  Many controversial rules in 
the DCFR will certainly be subject to further discussions within 
the legal and business community, including the various rules re-
ferencing the principle of good faith,174 a principle which, accord-
ing to the European common law jurisdictions of England and 
 
 171 See supra Part I.B.1. 
 172 Research conducted by the Acquis Group has greatly influenced the 
DCFR. See Aquis Group, European 
Research Group on Existing EC Private Law, http://www.acquis-group.org (last 
visited Nov. 12, 2009). 
 173 The Common Core Group‟s research focuses on finding the similarities 
between the contract laws of different EU jurisdictions.   International Universi-
ty College of Turin, The Common Core of European Private Law, The Project, 
Approach, http://www.common-core.org (last visited Oct. 29, 2009). 
 174 See infra Part II.B. 
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Wales, is not likely to be accepted without objection.175 
To ensure that the rules contained in the final CFR have suf-
ficient authority to serve as an accepted tool of interpretation, it 
is desirable that a representative number of lawyers, interest 
groups, and business people of all jurisdictions within the EU be-
come actively involved in the discussion and preparation of the 
CFR.  The academic DCFR should serve as the basis and the 
starting point of such discussion.  However, it is unclear whether 
such broad participation will be achieved because the task of rais-
ing enough interest for the process of harmonizing European con-
tract law seems far from being accomplished.  Even in the pres-
ence of sufficient interest within all member states, language 
impediment serves as one obstacle because the lack of translated 
DCFR versions will likely hinder involvement by some of the con-
cerned or interested parties.176 
B. Good Faith in the CFR - The Optional Instrument a Real 
Option? 
If the CFR was to serve not only as a tool box but also as an 
optional instrument, meaning a set of contract law rules which 
the parties may choose to govern their contractual relations, there 
is an even greater need for early participation of all groups con-
cerned.  Notably, involvement by business entities is particularly 
important for the CFR to be successful as an optional instrument.  
Unlike the CISG, the success of the CFR as an optional instru-
ment depends entirely on the acceptance and awareness of the 
business community.  If businesses are not familiar with the 
CISG or convinced by its provisions, then this may cause the fair-
ly common practice of opting-out by excluding the CISG‟s applica-
bility by virtue of the CISG Article 6.177  Nevertheless, the CISG 
is still of relative importance because it is autonomously applica-
ble to international sales contracts whenever the parties fail to 
exclude it. 
In contrast, if the CFR is to serve as an optional instrument, 
it will not apply autonomously but only if the parties “opt in.”  At 
least in the near future the “opt-in model” seems to be the only 
 
 175 See supra Part I.B.2.b. 
 176 Kuneva, supra note 154. 
 177 See supra Part I.C. 
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feasible choice.  In contrast, an “opt-out model” would mean that 
the CFR would replace national law if the parties do not expressly 
opt out of it in the choice of law provisions included in their con-
tracts.  First, this would raise difficult questions of competence by 
the European Community as it relates to the principles of subsi-
diarity and proportionality178 outlined in Article 5 of the new 
Treaty on European Union (“TEU”).179  While harmonized or 
common contract law may be practical and desirable to facilitate 
the common market, it is not particularly necessary because thus 
far individual member states were capable of resolving their con-
tract law issues.  Second, the CFR would, if applicable on an opt-
out basis, overlap with the CISG.  Finally, an “opt-out model” 
comes very close to the idea of a European civil law code which 
currently has too many opponents.180  As it currently stands, 
there are better arguments to support the “opt-in model,” which 
respects party autonomy to the greatest extent.181  However, the 
“opt-in model” means that the application of the CFR would be re-
stricted to cases of the parties‟ choice and the CFR would not ap-
ply autonomously without a choice-of-law clause.  Therefore the 
“opt-in model” would result in the CFR having a similar legal sta-
tus as the Uniform Laws in the UK.182  Any lack of familiarity of 
the business community with the CFR would entirely diminish its 
impact, since the parties are not likely to make an active choice 
for an instrument the parties are unfamiliar with. 
The European business community not only needs to be fa-
miliar with the CFR for it to be a success, but the provisions of 
the CFR also need to be acceptable for parties of different legal 
backgrounds.  This is doubtful, because if the DCFR‟s provisions 
on good faith were included in the final CFR they might be sub-
ject to a lot of controversy.  Due to the diverging opinions on the 
benefits of a codified good faith principle, the CISG is restricted 
 
 178 See Karen Battersby, Opt In? Opt Out? Presentation at Nottingham Law 
School, http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/cons_int/safe_shop/fair_bus_pract/ 
cont_law/stakeholders/5-10.pdf. 
 179 See sources cited supra note 140. 
 180 Joachim Jahn, Rettet das BGB vor Brüssel [Save the German Civil Code 
from Brussels], FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG, Oct. 10, 2006 (F.R.G.). 
 181 Stefan Leible, Was tun mit dem Gemeinsamen Referenzrahmen für das 
Europäische Vertragsrecht? - Plädoyer für ein optionales Instrument, 28 
BETRIEBS BERATER 1469, 1473 (2008) (F.R.G.). 
 182 See supra Part I.A. 
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by its single reference to good faith found in Article 7 on interpre-
tation of the Convention.  By contrast, the DCFR contains approx-
imately forty references to good faith and fair dealing scattered 
throughout its provisions. 
Similar to Article 7 of the CISG, Article I.-1:102 of the DCFR 
provides that in the interpretation and development of its provi-
sions, “regard should be had to the need to promote: (a) uniformity 
of application; (b) good faith and fair dealing; and (c) legal cer-
tainty.”  As analyzed, a reference to good faith in a provision con-
cerning statutory interpretation is not generally problematic if it 
is correctly applied to interpretation questions.183  On the other 
hand, considering that Article 7 of the CISG has given rise to 
some diverging decisions,184 the same might be the fate of the sim-
ilar Article I.-1:102 of the DCFR.  Foreseeing the risk of diverging 
decisions, the drafters of the DCFR included the principle of “le-
gal certainty” in letter c of the Article.  Still, the question of what 
shall prevail, “good faith and fair dealing” or “legal certainty,” 
remains open. 
Moreover, the DCFR‟s good faith principle is far more exten-
sive than that of the CISG.  For example, good faith is supposed 
to be respected when it comes to the parties‟ autonomy to con-
clude contracts (Article II.-1:102 (1) DCFR), it applies to pre-
contractual negotiations and creates pre-contractual duties (Ar-
ticle II.-3.301 DCFR), it is part of the DCFR‟s concepts of mistake 
(Article II.-7.201 (1)(b)(ii) DCFR) and fraud (Article II.-7:205(1) 
DCFR).  Furthermore, courts may adapt contracts according to 
the requirements of good faith and fair dealing (Article II.-
7:207(2) DCFR), and contracts have to be interpreted in light of 
the good faith principle (Article II.-8:102 (1)(g) DCFR), which al-
lows courts to include additional implied terms. 
There is also a general duty for the contracting parties to act 
in good faith in almost every situation stipulated by Article III. – 
1:103 (1) of the DCFR.  Under this provision, “[a] person has a du-
ty to act in accordance with good faith and fair dealing in perform-
ing an obligation, in exercising a right to performance, in pur-
suing or defending a remedy for non-performance, or in exercising 
a right to terminate an obligation or contractual relationship.”  
 
 183 See supra Part I.B.2.c. 
 184 See supra Part I.B.2.c.; see cases cited supra notes 127-28. 
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According to subsection (2) of this provision, the contracting par-
ties may not exclude or limit the duty of good faith and fair deal-
ing.  In case of breach, the party not acting in good faith is barred 
under subsection (3) from exercising its rights. 
While most of these applications of the good faith principle 
are familiar to a German lawyer,185 they are very likely to be an 
obstacle to the acceptance of the DCFR by English lawyers.186  
Moreover, English lawyers would understandably inquire about 
the necessity of including vague terms such as “good faith and fair 
dealing”.  Most applications of the good faith principle could be 
described more precisely without referencing the term “good 
faith” given the term‟s unclear meaning. 
Even providing a “definition” of good faith and fair dealing 
does not eliminate the uncertainty arising from the vast overuse 
of the term “good faith.”  For instance, Annex 1 to the DCFR pro-
vides: “Good faith and fair dealing refers to an objective standard 
of conduct. „Good faith‟ on its own may refer to a subjective men-
tal attitude, often characterized by an absence of knowledge of 
something which, if known, would adversely affect the morality of 
what is done.”187 
Most lawyers would agree that it is not only difficult but per-
haps impossible to define “good faith.”  Even though the drafters 
of the DCFR made a good effort in their attempt to define this va-
gue term, the definition remains somewhat incomplete.  To help 
define “good faith,” the definition in Annex 1 to the DCFR just 
cited includes yet more vague terms such as “morality.”  To help 
illustrate the dilemma with the attempts to define “good faith,” it 
is instructive to quote the German author, Johann Wolfgang von 
Goethe, who wrote: “And here I stand, with all my lore, Poor fool, 
no wiser than before.”188 
 
 185 See supra Part I.B.2.a. 
 186 See supra Part I.B.2.b. 
 187 DCFR, supra note 155, at 338. 
 188 Translated from the original German text: “Da steh’ ich nun, ich armer 
Thor! Und bin so klug als wie zuvor.” JOHANN WOLFGANG VON GOETHE, FAUST, 
EINE TRAGÖDIE [FAUST, THE FIRST PART OF THE TRAGEDY], ch. 1 Nacht [Night] (K. 
H. Hucke ed., Aschendorff 2008) (1808), available at 
http://www.gutenberg.org/etext/ 21000 (e-book to download), translation availa-
ble at http://www.gutenberg. org/etext/14591 (e-book to download, Bayard Taylor 
trans.). 
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CONCLUSION 
The greatest difficulty that projects from contract law har-
monization is finding the balance between the need for legal clari-
ty and the need for flexible solutions where precise rules lead to 
unjust results.  Discussions about the benefits of the good faith 
principle usually attempt to resolve this difficulty.  While most 
lawyers of civil law jurisdictions, particularly lawyers from Ger-
man legal systems, are more familiar with and open towards the 
good faith principle, lawyers from common law countries, espe-
cially English lawyers, tend to prefer clear rules over any vague 
good faith provisions.  By including a principle of good faith in Ar-
ticle 7, the CISG‟s attempt was to find compromise between these 
varying views, while at the same time, restricting its application 
to matters of construction of the Convention‟s provisions.  The 
DCFR on the other hand does not contain a similar compromise 
but instead contains a clear choice for the good faith principle 
with all its possible applications.  This choice is not surprising 
when considering that the majority of the DCFR drafters are from 
civil law jurisdictions.  The importance of good faith and fair deal-
ing as emphasized in the DCFR is nearly equivalent to the impor-
tance of the principle of good faith (Treu und Glauben) under 
German law. 
With such a far reaching notion of good faith, the final CFR 
could not be successful as an optional instrument.  It is difficult to 
imagine that businesses or lawyers from the UK would be choos-
ing the CFR as the law governing individual contracts if the CFR 
contained the DCFR‟s extensive references to good faith and fair 
dealing.  Moreover, under the DCFR, courts have a large discre-
tionary authority while party autonomy is to a great extent li-
mited by the principle of good faith and fair dealing.  Limiting 
party autonomy appears problematic within the context of inter-
national business contracts.189 
Lastly, the CISG‟s tendency to compromise has also caused 
interpretative problems and diverging decisions.  Nevertheless, 
 
 189 Horst Eidenmüller, Florian Faust, Hans Christoph Grigoleit, Nils Jansen, 
Gerhard Wagner & Reinhard Zimmermann, Der Gemeinsame Referenzrahmen 
für das Europäische Privatrecht: Wertungsfragen und Kodifikationsprobleme 
[The Common Frame of Reference for European Private Law: Policy Choices and 
Codification Problems], 63 JURISTEN ZEITUNG (No. 11) 529 (2008), translated in 
28 OXFORD J. OF LEGAL STUD. (No. 4) 659 (2008). 
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given that worldwide legal systems, including the European Un-
ion differ remarkably, compromises are often the only building 
blocks for projects of contract law harmonization.  Although the 
DCFR has not been sufficiently discussed by European lawyers 
and businesses, it is already anticipated that additional compro-
mises will have to be made before the final CFR can become a 
successful optional instrument.  Under the current state of flux 
encapsulating the DCFR, it is unlikely that its various references 
to good faith and fair dealing will survive in its finalized form. 
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